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28th day of August, 1974,

(R-lOf.

The defendant-

respondent filed a motion to dismiss and accompanying
memorandum and affidavit on the first day of October,
1974.

(R-14, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20).

This motion came

up for hearing on the 22nd day of October, 1974 (R-24)
before Judge Jeppson who denied the defendant-respondent's
motion to dismiss.

Subsequently the defendant-respondent

filed on the 25th day of October, 1974, a motion to
reconsider (R-25) which was heard by Judge Bryant Croft
on the 21st day of July, 1975. (R-29).

Judge Croft

denied defendant-respondent's motion to reconsider.
(R-30, il).

Shortly thereafter a petition for interlocutory

appeal was filed with the Supreme Court of Utah.

(R-32-43).

Subsequently the Supreme Court sent notice that said
interlocutory appeal was denied.

On the 30th day of

October, 1975, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a motion
to amend their complaint so as to include Douglas and
Suzanne Holbrook as party plaintiffs.

(R-48).

Judge

Croft granted plaintiffs-appellants' motion to amend their
complaint on the 10th day of November, 1975.

(R-53)6

The defendant-respondent then filed their
motion for summary judgment and accompanying memorandum
on the 29th day of January, 1976.

(R-91-94 and 99-105).

Judge Sawaya granted the defendant-respondent's motion
for summary judgment on the 26th day of February, 1976.
(R-124, 125).
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It is from this judgment that plaintiffs-appellants
instituted their appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent, State of Utah, by and
through the Road Commission and third-party defendantrespondent, Summit County, seek an affirmance of the
summary judgment in their favor which was granted by the
Honorable Judge James Sawaya.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The plaintiffs-appellants were the owners
of lots 12 and 14 on plat "E" of the Summit Park subdivision which is located just east of the top of
Parleys Summit in Summit County, Utah,
In 1970 and 1972 (R-114) the defendantrespondent started acquiring various parcels of property in
the Summit Park area.

The parcels of ground were

acquired for the purpose of widening 1-80 and resurfacing
of Summit Drive.

Originally it was planned to use Summit

Drive as a detour road during the construction of 1-80.
(R-22).

The cul-de-sac on which the plaintiffs-appellants1

lots are located goes off in a westerly direction off
Summit Drive.

(R-3).

In September of 19 74, the defendant-respondent
completed the resurfacing of Summit Drive.
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(R-94).

No property was acquired from the plaintiffsappellants to enable the defendant-respondent to
resurface Summit Drive.

(R-17).

In August of 1971, the defendant-respondent,
State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission,
entered into a lease with the third-party defendantrespondent, Summit County.

(R-85).

The land was

adjacent on the east to the plaintiffs-appellants, Waltons'
property.

The particular tract of land covered by this

lease is the remainder of a lot that was purchased by
the defendant-respondent.

(R-114)«

Summit County then

proceeded to locate an equipment and maintenance shed
on the property located directly to the east of the
plaintiffs-appellants, Waltons', lot.

The shed houses

maintenance and fire protection equipment for the protection of the homes and maintenance of the roads in
Summit Park subdivision.

(R-86).

That at no time prior to the filing of this
action did the plaintiffs-appellants serve written notice
on the defendant-respondent, Utah State Road Commission,
and the Office of the Attorney General.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
Plaintiffs-Appellants1 action for the recovery
of alleged damages to their property caused
-4-

by the resurfacing of Summit Park is barred by the
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.

The issue has been

before the Utah Supreme Court repeatedly and only
recently in the case of Holt v. Utah State Road
Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973) was
ruled upon by the Court.

In the Holt case, the

plaintiffs alleged that the access restriction amounted
to a taking and that under the ruling of Hampton v.
Utah State Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d
708 (1968), they were entitled to damages.
The plaintiff in the Holt case urged the
Supreme Court to decide the case on the precedent
of the Hampton case.

It is noted, however, that in

the Holt decision no mention is made of the Hampton
case.

It is also noted that the Court did state:

" . . . The law has long been established
in this State that under those circumstances
(changing of grade and access impairment)
there can be no recovery from the State for
damages because the construction of a highway
may impair or adversely affect the convenience
of access to property. Sufficient has been
said as to the pro and con of this subject
that we think it unnecessarily and undesirable
to extenuate thereon. But refer to the
adjudicated cases.11 Holt v. Utah State Road
Comission, Supra, (words in brackets mine)
The Court then referred to the cases
supporting the above stated proposition which include
Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907;
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354
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Po2d 105, Springville Banking Company v. Burton,
10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 and Anderson Investment
Corp. v. State of Utah, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144.
In the Holt case, reference to Hampton v. State Road
Commission is conspicuously absent*

Defendant submits

that the Hjorth case and the Fairclough case are
still good law and the cases of Anderson Investment
and Holt support this position.
It is apparent that the Hampton case has
been so limited in its scope that it should only
apply to cases of identical factual situations.

The

instant case involves a widening and change of
grade almost identical to the Hjorth, Fairclough and
Holt case and cases cited therein are, defendant
submits, dispositive of the instant case.
'the Court in the Holt case also dealt with
the applicability of the Governmental Immunity Act,
Section 63-30-1 through 63-30-34, Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended).

The Court cited Section 63-30-6

and 63-30-3 of the Act and concluded:
,f

In considering the possible application
of the foregoing statute to the problem
presented it is pertinent to note that Section
63-30-3 of the Act expressly provides for a
continuance of sovereign immunity 'Except as may
be otherwise provided in this Act . . .
for any injury which may result from . . . the
exercise . . . of a governmental function,'
this seems to indicate that the Act be strictly
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applied to preserve sovereign immunity; and
to waive it only as clearly expressed therein.
It is our opinion that reading Section 6 in
the light of that rule, the waiver of immunity
from suit 'for the recovery of any property real
or personal or for the possession thereof'
cannot be construed to include an action of
this character to recover damages for inconvenience of access to property, nor as changing
the law as set forth in the cases cited
herein." Holt v. State Road Commission, Supra.
It is clear from the above statement that
the Governmental Immunity Act does not allow recovery
in cases such as the one pending before this court.
It is also clear from the last sentence of the
portion of the Holt case above cited that the law
was not changed by the Hampton case and that the
Hjorth, Pairclough, Anderson Investment and other
cases supporting sovereign immunity represent the
present law.
It is to be noted plaintifffs contention
that the instant case differs

from the cases denying

recovery in that an allegation is made that the access
impairment constitutes a "taking" and therefore, the
Hampton case should control.

The same contention was

made in both the Anderson Investment case and the
Holt case.

The allegation that the State's impairment

of access constituted a taking in these two cases was
not sufficient to overcome a Motion to Dismiss.

It is

also noted that, according to appellant's brief, in the
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Holt case, the dismissal was made even though no
evidence had been taken.
"The record is extremely handicapped
in view of the fact that there has been
no evidence taken in support of plaintiff's
Complaint." (P.12 of appellant's brief).
Defendant-appellant concludes by submitting
that in cases where there has been no physical taking
of an abutting owners property an action for damages
cannot be sustained because of the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity as expressed in the cases cited herein,
Hampton v. State Road Commission, notwithstanding.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERROR IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The major case which the plaintiffrespondent relies upon is Hampton v. State Road
Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968).
The Hampton case was instituted prior to the enactment
of the Utah Waiver of Iiranunity Act, which was in July
of 1966.

In fact, the Hampton case specifically held:

"• o • Consistently and historically
we have ruled that the State may not be sued without
its consent, taken the view that Article I,
Section 22 of our Constitution is not self
executing, nor does it give consent to be
sued, implied or otherwise; and that to
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secure such consent is a legislative matter, a
principle recognized by the legislature
itself. . ." (Emphasis added).
The court went on to allow suit under
Section 78-11-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953), which
with the passage of the Waiver of the Sovereign
Immunity Act, was repealed and replaced by Section
63-30-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended.

The

Supreme Court interpreted Section 63-30-6 in the Holt
case, Supra.

In the Holt case the court strictly con-

strued 6 3-30-6 and preserved the defendant-respondent's
sovereign immunity.
Arguendo, if the plaintiffs-appellants have
a cause of action, they must follow the procedure as
outlined in the Waiver of the Sovereign Immunity Act,
Sections 63-30-1 through 34, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
In neither the plaintiff-respondent's original complaint
nor in their amended complaint is there an allegation
as to compliance with the necessary requirements of
the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Act.

(R-l and 50).

The plaintiffs-appellants were required
to give written notice of claim within one year after
the cause of action arose.
In Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah
2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court
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considered a suit for damages against the State for
changing the drainage pattern of surface water.

The

court there held that such an action constituted an
action for private nuisance, and that it was included
within the waiver of immunity under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated
Section 63-30-1, et seg. (1967).

That Act provides

specific time limits for notice to governmental
entities after a cause of action arises.

Section

63-30-12 provides:
"A claim against the State or any
agency thereof as defined herein shall
be forever barred unless notice thereof
is filed with the Attorney General of
the State of Utah and the agency concerned
within one year after the cause of action arises."
In Scarborough v. Granite School District,
531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court
outlined the elements of a proper notice of Claim*
The court there said:
"We have consistently held that where a
cause of action is based upon a statute, full
compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a
suit. In order to so meet the requirements of
the statute quoted above and fulfill its
intended purpose, the "filing" of a claim
should include these essentials: that it be
in writing; that it contain a brief statement of the facts and the nature of the claim
asserted; that it be subscribed by the party
required to give it and who intends to rely
on it; that it be directed to or responsible
for receiving it; and that this be done within
the prescribed time. "531 P.2d at 482.
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The Supreme Court specifically held in
that case that an oral notice would not comply with
the statute.

The court has also held that actual

knowledge by the governmental entity or an investigation by the governmental entity would not comply
with the statute.

Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158,

506 P.2d 435 (1973).
Furthermore, the fact that notice was
given must be alleged in the complaint.

In

Roosendaal Construction & Mining Corp. v. Holman,
28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972), the court held:
"A prerequisite in pursuing a claim
against the State or its officers is a
compliance with Section 63-30-12, U.C.A.
1953, which reads as follows:
A claim against the state or
any agency thereof as defined
herein shall be forever barred
unless notice thereof is filed with
the Attorney General of the State
of Utah and the agency concerned within
one year after the cause of action
arises.
It appears that the plaintiffs complaint
is fatally defective m that it does not
allege compliance with that section." (R-10).
(Emphasis added).
In this case no notice was given until
August 28, 1974, which is the date of the service
of summons in this case.

(R-10).

This is

despite the fact the road in question was completed
some two years earlier.

(R-94).
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No notice was

alleged in the complaint.

Plaintiffs1 claim is,

therefore, barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The time for the filing of plaintiffsappellants' notice of claim expired as of September,
19 73.

The road in question having been completed in

September of 1972 (R-94).
The case of Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Cent. Ry.
Co., 249 P. 1036, 1039-40 (1926), defines the law in
Utah as to limitations of actions where there are
continuing damages.

There the plaintiff brought

an action for damages to her property resulting from
the construction and continued operation of a nearby
railroad.

She based her claim on nuisance, and on

Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution,
asserting that her property had been "taken" or
"damaged" within the meaning of the Constitution.
The trial court found that although the injuries
complained of were compensable, the plaintiff Is.
claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations and
directed a verdict for the defendant.

On appeal she

claimed that because the damages complained of were of
a continuing nature and were increasing, the Statute
of Limitations did not barr her claim.

The Supreme

Court affirmed the trial court in the following
language:
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"Where the wrong done by the railroad
company is temporary in its naturef as in
leaving cars unnecessarily on its track, or
while engaged in the work of laying down its
track, something existing today and not tomorrow,
fluctuating in extent and depending on the everrepeated action of the company, only such
damages as have fully accrued prior to the
commencement of the suit are recoverable, and
none based upon any presumed continuance or
repetition of the wrong.
But where the wrong is of a permanent
nature and springs from the manner in which
the track, as fully completed, affects
approach to the lot, then, notwithstanding
the right which the state retains to control
the manner of use of a highway by a railroad
company, even if deemed necessary to compel an
entire removal of its track, the lot owner
may treat the act of the company as a permanent
appropriation of the right of access to his
lot, and recover as damages the consequent
depreciation in value of the lot.
. . .when the original nuisance is of
a permanent character so that the damage
inflicted thereby is of a permanent character,
and goes to the entire destruction of the estate
affected thereby or will be likely to continue
for an indefinite period, and during its
existence deprive the landowner of any
beneficial use of that portion of his estate,
a recovery not only may, but must be had for
the entire damage in one action, as the damage
is deemed to be original; and as the entire
damage accrues from the time the nuisance is
created and only one recovery can be had, the
statute of limitations begins to run from the time
of its erection against the owner of the
estate or estates affected thereby."(Emphasis
added).
Thus, where the injury, although continuous,
is caused by a permanent structure or will likely
continue indefinitely, there is but one cause of
action arising from it, and the limiting statute
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commences to run at the time the injury begins.
The plaintiffs-appellants allege the
damage was caused by the resurfacing and widening of
an access road, a permanent structure. Plaintiffs1
sole cause of action for such injuries arose, at the
latest in September of 1972, upon the completion
of the road.

The statutory period for filing a

claim has long since expired.
Corpus Juris Secundum supports the rule
established by the Utah courts. At 54 C.J.S.
Limitations on Actions, Sec. 169, p. 128, it defines
the term "permanent structure" as follows:
"A permanent structure as respects
running of the Statute of Limitations has
been defined as one which may not be
readily remedied, removed, or abated at a
reasonable expense or one of a durable
character evidently intended to last
indefinitely."
* * *

"Where the case is such that all damages,
both past and future can be presently estimated
and recovered in one action, successive actions
cannot be brought for recurring or continuing
damages, and the statute runs from the time
the original cause of action accrues."
* * *

"An action for injuries to land from
water seeping from a property constructed
irrigation ditch which is intended to be
permanent constitutes a single cause of
action, and as affected by the Statute of
Limitations accrues at the beginning of the
injury." 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions,
Sec. 173. (Emphasis added).
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The law in other jurisdictions is also
in agreement with the Utah law.
In Power Farms Inc. v. Consolidated Irr.
Dist., 119 P.2d 717 (Cal. 1941), the plaintiff brought
an action for damages caused by water seepage.
A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was rendered
by the trial court.

The California Supreme Court,

however, found that the plaintiff had failed to
file a claim against the defendant according to a
state statute and on that ground reversed the lower
court's decision.

In response to the argument that

the statute had not run because of the continuing
nature of the damage, the court stated:
"Where the time and extent of injury are
uncertain, a statutory period of limitation
begins to run when the fact that damage is
occurring becomes apparent and discoverable,
even though the extent of the damage may still
be unknown." Id. at 721.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS• MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT.
Plaintiffs-Appellantsf original complaint
was filed in August of 1974. The original plaintiffs were
the Waltons.

(R-l and 2).

Subsequently on the 30th

day of October, 1975, the plaintiffs sought to amend
their complaint to join the Holbrooks as party plaintiffs.
On November 10, 1975, Judge Croft granted plaintiffs-
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appellants' motion to amend their complaint (R-53).
As indicated on Page Nine of plaintiffs-appellants'
brief, the plaintiff-appellant, Holbrook, learned of
the resurfacing of Summit Drive in the latter
part of 1972 (deposition of Holbrook, pages 9-10).
As indicated in the previous arguments, the plaintiffsappellants failed to file their appropriate notice of
claim within the prescribed time.

In Point II, it is

stated that Summit Drive was completed in September of 1972.
In Section 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated,
(1953) , the Statute of Limitations with respect to
injuries to real property is three years.

Following

this to its logical conclusion, the Statute of Limitations would run as of September of 1975.

In the

instant case the plaintiffs-appellants, Holbrooks,
did not seek to intervene in the lawsuit until
October 30, 1975.

(R-48),

This would mean the

plaintiffs-appellants, Holbrooks, were at least 30
days beyond the three year Statute of Limitatic n in
which to commence their action.
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
THE MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE WHICH WAS FILED BY THE
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, SUMMIT COUNTY.
The third-party defendant-respondent,
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Summit County, filed their motion to change the
place of trial to Summit County (R-67 and 111).
In both of these motions, the District Court refused
to change the place of the trial to Summit County.
Section 78-13-1 of the Utah Code Annotated,
(1953) as amended, requires that injuries to real
property must be tried in the county in which the cause
of action arises.

It is apparent from plaintiffs-

appellants1 complaint (R-l) that the property in
question is located in Summit County.
CONCLUSION
Judge James Sawaya correctly applied the
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act and because
of the plaintiffs-appellants failure to comply therewith,
justifiably granted the defendant-respondent's motion
for summary judgment.

Also that Judge Jeppson erred in

not granting defendant-respondent's motion to dismiss
since the State of Utah has not waived its sovereign
immunity with respect to actions of this type.
It is for these reasons the Supreme Court
should uphold the decision of the District Court
and affirm the ruling of the Honorable Judge James Sawaya.

dSJCEPHEN C. WARD
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent,
U t a h S t a t e Road Commission
115 S t a t e C a p i t o l
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 84114

ROBERT W. ADKINS
Attorney for Third-Party DefendantRespondent, Summit County
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